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STRIP DOWN OF HOME MORTGAGES:
UNDRESSING 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)
INTRODUCTION

Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") 1 provides for
the "[a]djustment of [d]ebts of an [i]ndividual with a [r]egular
[i]ncome."' 2 The primary purpose of chapter 131 is to enable an individual4 to restructure his debts 5 in a payment plan lasting be-

' Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)). The Bankruptcy Code repealed and replaced the
National Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See National Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat.
544, amended by Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 [hereinafter Bankruptcy Act of 1898].
Congress enacted the Code to "embody the substantive law of bankruptcy and ...to modernize the bankruptcy law." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5787 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 989]. Chapter 13 is one of the five operative chapters in title 11 of the United States Code under which a bankruptcy case may be
filed. Id. at 5789.
S11 U.S.C. § 1301 (1988).
s See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 5799. Congress intended chapter 13 to "provide
a simple yet precise and effective system for individuals to pay debts under bankruptcy
court protection and supervision." Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 595] (bankruptcy relief should be effective, and should provide debtor with a fresh start). Chapter 13
furthers the overall congressional intent to provide debtors with a fresh start while protecting the interests of creditors. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 71 (1973) [hereinafter
COMMISSION REPORT]. See generally BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY
LAW MANUAL

1-4 (1986) (delineating bankruptcy law's purposes); 5

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

1300.02 (15th ed. 1991) [hereinafter COLLIER] ("Purposes of Chapter 13").
1 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988). Chapter 13 is available only to individual debtors, including self-employed individuals engaged in business. See id. § 1304(a). According to §
109(e), "[o]nly an individual with regular income that owes, on the date of the filing of the
petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than $100,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than $350,000 ... may be a debtor under chapter 13
of this title." Id. § 109(e). "[I]ndividual with regular income" is defined in § 101(29) as an
"individual whose income is sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to make
payments under a plan under chapter 13 of this title, other than a stockbroker or a commodity broker." Id. § 101(29).
Under the Bankrdptcy Act of 1898, only "wage earners," i.e., individuals whose principal income consisted of wages, salary, or commissions, qualified for chapter 13 relief. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 1, § 608(8); see also S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 5799
(discussing defects in prior chapter XIII provisions). However, the Code expanded the scope
of chapter 13 relief to include self-employed individuals and those whose primary income is
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tween three and five years.' As part of the plan, the debtor may
modify the terms of most secured claims;7 however, the creditor
derived from welfare, social security, fixed pensions, and investment income. See, e.g., In re
Overstreet, 23 B.R. 712 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1982) (unemployment benefits); In re Wood, 23
B.R. 552 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (pension benefits); In re Taylor, 15 B.R. 596 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 1981) (child support payments). But see In re Patterson, 64 B.R. 807 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1986) (not available to probate estate); In re Monaco, 36 B.R. 882 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1983) (chapter 13 not available to husband and wife businesses operated as partnerships).
' S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 5799. The debtor may "propose and have approved a
reasonable plan for debt repayment based on that individual's exact circumstances." Id.
Upon filing a bankruptcy petition, all of the debtor's legal and equitable interests in property are included in the bankruptcy estate, 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988), and an automatic
stay is imposed to prevent creditors from commencing or continuing any action against the
debtor or the estate for the recovery of a claim. Id. § 362. The automatic stay is a fundamental protection which not only shields the debtor, but also prevents individual creditors
from depleting estate assets to the detriment of other creditors. WEINTRAUB & RESNICK,
supra note 3, at 1-31. Once the case is filed, the bankruptcy court obtains exclusive jurisdiction over the estate's assets and can equitably distribute them among the creditors pursuant
to the restructuring plan. Id. See generally David S. Kennedy, Chapter 13 Under the Bankruptcy Code, 19 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 137, 146-49 (1989) (discussing automatic stays).
6 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1988).
' See id. § 1322(b)(2). Section 1322(b)(2) provides, in pertinent part, that the plan may
"modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence." Id. A "security interest" is a "lien created by agreement," § 101(51), whereas a "lien" is a "charge against or
interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation." Id. §
101(37). A claim is secured "to the extent of the value of [the] creditor's interest in the
estate's interest in such property." Id. § 506(a). An undersecured claim is considered unsecured to the extent that the allowed claim exceeds the value of the collateral. Id.
There is considerable disparity among the courts concerning the determination of collateral valuation. S. Andrew Bowman & William M. Thompson, Secured Claims Under Section 1325(a)(5)(B): Collateral Valuation, Present Value, and Adequate Protection, 15 IND.
L. REV. 569, 571 (1982). The only congressional dictate is that "value shall be determined in
light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property." 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988). See generally Bowman & Thompson, supra, at 569-80
(thorough analysis of measure and timing of valuation). It is generally accepted by the
courts that the collateral valuation "may change during the course of the bankruptcy case."
3 COLLIER, supra note 3, 506.04[2], at 506-25. The valuation is made on a case-by-case
basis, and because of the varying factors that a court must consider, it is rarely predictable.
Id. at 506-26.
The debtor's plan must provide for payment on unsecured claims in an amount "not
less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were
liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on [the effective date of the plan]." 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(4) (1988). Furthermore, the holder of an unsecured claim may object to the plan,
thus requiring the court to deny it, unless the plan "provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable income to be received [over the life of the plan] will be applied to make
payments under the plan." Id. § 1325(b)(1)(B). "Disposable income" is income "not reasonably necessary ... for the maintenance or support of the debtor or [his dependents]; and...
the payment of expenditures necessary for the continuation, preservation, and operation of
[the debtor's] business." Id. § 1325(b)(2)(A), (2)(B).
With few exceptions, upon successfully completing the plan, the chapter 13 debtor re-
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retains its lien and is entitled to the full value, with interest, of the
collateral securing the claim.'
An exception to the debtor's modification rights was created
for home mortgage lenders in section 1322(b)(2), which provides
that a plan under chapter 13 may not modify the "rights of holders
of

. .

. a claim secured only by . . . the debtor's principal resi-

dence."' In interpreting this section, however, three circuit courts
of appeals recently held that bifurcating a home mortgage loan in
accordance with section 506(a) into a secured claim, equal to the
fair market value of the property securing the loan, and an unsecured claim, equal to the amount by which the loan balance exceeds that property's value, is not a modification of the mortgagee's rights.' 0 Furthermore, these courts concluded that following
bifurcation, the protection of section 1322(b)(2) applies only to the
ceives "a discharge of all debts provided for by the plan." Id. § 1328(a).
I See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (1988). The plan will be confirmed if:
(5) With respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien securing
such claim; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of sdch claim is not less than the allowed amount
of such claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder
Id. (emphasis added). Section 1325(a) is one of the Code's "cram-down" provisions. See In
re Catlin, 81 B.R. 522, 525 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987). It requires that secured creditors receive
the present value of the claim determined by proposed stream of future payments. Id.
To equate the allowed secured claim with the present value of deferred future payments, the plan may "propose interest payments over and above the face amount of the
allowed secured claim at whatever interest rate is equivalent to the discount rate selected by
the court or agreed upon by the parties." 5 COLLIER, supra note 3, 1 1325.06[4][b][iii][B];
see also GMAC v. Miller (In re Miller), 13 B.R. 110, 118 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1981). The variety of interest rates employed by the courts "almost equals the number of decisions confronting this issue." Bowman & Thompson, supra note 7, at 581 (listing, inter alia, legal
rate, judgment rate, contract rate, IRS rate, prime rate, market rate, and arbitrary rates).
0 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
10See Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410, 1415 (10th Cir.
1991); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 124 (3rd Cir. 1990);
Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1989).
Section 506(a) states that
[a]n allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate
has an interest ...is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's
interest in the estate's interest in such property ...and is an unsecured claim to
the extent that the value of such creditor's interest ...is less than the amount of
such allowed claim.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
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secured portion of the lender's claim. 1 Although a growing number
of courts share this view of section 1322(b)(2),"2 a staunch minority 13 argues that bifurcation of a home mortgage renders the pro4
tection of section 1322(b)(2) meaningless.1
This Note will examine the application of sections 506(a) and
1322(b)(2) to home mortgage debt in chapter 13 proceedings. Part
I will discuss the opinions of the Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits,
which allow modification of the unsecured portion of a mortgage.
Part II will analyze the plain meaning of, and highlight the ambiguity within, section 1322(b)(2). Part III will review the legislative
history surrounding the enactment of the anti-modification clause.
Finally, Part IV will consider the implications of the opposing interpretations of section 1322(b)(2) and conclude that to allow undersecured mortgages to be "stripped down" to the fair market
value of the property frustrates Congress's clear intent to protect
the home mortgage industry.
I.

THE THREE CIRCUITS

In the 1989 decision of Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co.
(In re Hougland),5 the Ninth Circuit shocked the lending community by holding that a chapter 13 debtor could strip away the undersecured portion of his home mortgage without violating section
" See Hart, 923 F.2d at 1415 ("undersecured mortgage is ... two claims, and only the
secured claim is protected"); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 124 ("unsecured portion ... may be modified"); Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1185 ("secured portion has special protection," while "unsecured portion does not"); see also infra notes 15-31 and accompanying text (examining
circuit court decisions).
" WEINTRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 3, at 59-63 (Supp. 1990). However, prior to the
Hougland decision, the majority of bankruptcy courts prohibited bifurcation and protected
the entire secured claim. See In re Roberts, 99 B.R. 653, 655 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (citing
H. Barkley, Jr., A Memorandum: The Second and Other Junior Mortgages on a Debtor's
Residence, NAT'L Ass'N CHAPTER THIRTEEN TRUSTEES Q., Oct. 1988, at 11-14).
'.See, e.g., In re Russell, 93 B.R. 703, 106-07 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1988); In re Catlin, 81
B.R. 522, 524 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987); In re Hynson, 66 B.R. 246, 253 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
The bulk of the anti-bifurcation cases have followed as a consequence of and in reaction to
the circuit court decisions. See, e.g., Nobelman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobelman),
129 B.R. 98, 101-03 (N.D. Tex. 1991); In re Etchin, 128 B.R. 662, 667-68 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
1991); In re Sauber, 115 B.R. 197, 198-99 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990); In re Chavez, 117 B.R.
733, 737 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990).
" See In re Mitchell, 125 B.R. 5, 6 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) (noting split of authority and
enumerating courts holding minority view); Hart, 923 F.2d at 1417 (Brorby, J., dissenting)
(same).
15 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989).
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1322(b)(2). 16 The Hougland court, observing that the debtor's
mortgage loan balance exceeded the value of the debtor's home by
several thousand dollars at the time the bankruptcy petition was
filed,' 7 held that since section 506(a) was applicable to chapter 13
proceedings, the debt should be bifurcated into secured and unsecured portions.' s Furthermore, the court found that section
1322(b)(2) applied only to the secured portion of the mortgage and
consequently held that the unsecured portion could be modified
under the plan.'" The Hougland court examined the following language of section 1322(b): "the plan may ...

modify the rights of

holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by...
the debtor's principal residence, '2° and concluded that because of
its position in the sentence, the "other than" clause should be read
as referring only to the "secured claims" language. 2 1 The court reasoned that Congress failed to restrict the word "claim" in the
"other than" clause solely for the purpose of maintaining the "natural rhythm and flow" of the sentence.2 2 Notwithstanding its acknowledgment of Congress's intent to benefit home mortgage lenders, 23 the Ninth Circuit concluded that only the secured portion of
a lender's claim is protected from modification by section 1322.24
16

Id. at 1185; see also Lenders Cringe As Judges Chop Mortgage Value, WALL ST. J.,

Sept. 26, 1990, at B1 (circuit court ruling contrary to lender expectations).
" Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1182-83. In 1983, as part of an Oregon State program to assist
U.S. veterans, the Houglands obtained a loan from Lomas & Nettleton Co., secured only by
a deed of trust on their home. Id. at 1182. After missing several payments, the debtors filed
for chapter 13 protection. Id. The bankruptcy court denied confirmation of the debtor's
plan, but the district court reversed. Id.
,1 Id. at 1183-84. Section 103(a) states that chapters 1, 3, and 5 contain general provisions that apply to cases in chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13. Id. Thus, the court concluded that the
definitions of secured and unsecured claims established by § 506(a) applied to the use of
those terms in § 1322(b)(2). Id. This aspect of the court's reasoning is not disputed because
the Senate report accompanying the approved bill specifically stated that "[t]hroughout the
bill, references to secured claims are only to the claim determined to be secured under [§
506(a)], and, not to the full amount of the creditor's claim." S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1,
at 5854.
,0 Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1185.
20 Id. at 1183 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988)).
at 1184.
2 Id.
Id. "Congress need not create such an awkward and wooden sentence structure. We
2
also find the suggestion of amicus that the word 'such' should have preceded the word
'claim' to be equally unfelicitous, and little more than a bow to legal jargon." Id. But see
infra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's frequent use of "such").
23 See Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1185 ("those who have set out to harvest the legislative
history have only been able to reap the conclusion that Congress intended to benefit residential real estate lenders").
24 Id.
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The following year in Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage
Corp.,2" the Third Circuit expressly agreed with the Ninth Circuit's determination that section 1322, by its plain meaning, protects only the secured portion of an undersecured claim.2" Dismissing the lender's argument that this interpretation conflicts
with congressional intent, the court stated that "although it is
clear that the anti-modification provision of the Act was inserted
on behalf of the home mortgage industry, the fact that the provision itself was a compromise suggests that the residential mortgage
providers did not emerge with all the protection they may have
sought." 7
Most recently, in Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re
25 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990). In 1983, the Wilsons purchased their home by obtaining
a loan secured by the real estate and "any and all appliances, machinery, furniture and
equipment (whether fixtures or not) of any nature whatsoever now or hereafter installed in
or upon said premises." Id. at 124. Subsequently, the debtors filed for chapter 13 relief and
the mortgage company submitted a proof of secured claim in the amount of $38,176.75, the
balance due on the mortgage. Id. However, the Wilsons commenced an adversary proceeding
to reduce the secured claim to the value of the house, which was stipulated at $22,000. Id.
The bankruptcy court allowed the reduction because the mortgage by its terms was secured
by personal property in addition to the real estate, and therefore was not protected under §
1322(b)(2). Id. at 125. The district court affirmed. Id.
26 Id. at 127. It is suggested that because the loan was secured by property other than
the debtor's principal residence, the court's discussion of the statute's protection for residential lenders is dictum. See id. at 126 n.1.
It should be noted that the court implicitly agreed with the bankruptcy court below in
holding "[als an alternative basis for [its] decision ...[that] the anti-modification provision
of section 1322 does not bar the bankruptcy court's order because the creditor's interest was
not secured only by real property as required by the statute." Id. at 128. The language of
the statute is clear in that it does not protect loans with a security interest in property in
addition to the debtor's principal residence. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988). Thus, courts
permit modification of mortgages with additional security such as hazard insurance proceeds, In re Klein, 106 B.R. 396, 400 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989), appliances, Caster v. United
States (In re Caster), 77 B.R. 8, 12 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987), credit life disability and property
damage proceeds, In re Wilson, 91 B.R. 74, 76 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988), and adjoining lots,
In re Morphis, 30 B.R. 589, 594 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983). However, some courts have prevented modification where the additional collateral was without any independent value. In
re Foster, 61 B.R. 492, 495 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986).
27 See Wilson, 895 F.2d at 128. But see infra notes 73-107 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of § 1322(b)(2)). The Wilson court failed to recognize that the
compromise, alluded to in the legislative history of § 1322, was that the anti-modification
provision would be limited to mortgages on the debtor's principal residence instead of applying to all claims "wholly secured by mortgages on real property". See infra notes 75-107
and accompanying text; see also Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 246
(5th Cir. 1984) ("Senate receded from its position that no 'modification' was to be permitted
of any mortgage secured by real estate"). Thus, although residential lenders did not score a
total victory, it is suggested that they were able to protect all of their rights in the debtor's
principal residence.
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Hart),28 the Tenth Circuit continued this trend towards allowing
the bifurcation of undersecured home mortgages. After recognizing
the Hougland and Wilson decisions, 29 the Eastland court acknowledged the split of opinion on the bifurcation issue among the lower
courts in several other circuits. 30 However, the court dismissed the
arguments of the anti-bifurcation courts, and held that section
1322(b)(2) does not preclude a debtor from stripping down home
mortgage claims to the fair market value of the property.3 '
II.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

All three of the circuit courts ruling on the bifurcation issue
declared that section 1322(b)(2) unambiguously applies only to the
-8 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991). The facts in Hart are almost identical to those in
Wilson, including the securing of the mortgage with "collateral other than the debtor's principal residence." Id. at 1413. The Tenth Circuit did not rely solely upon this fact, however;
it decided the bifurcation issue because the district court "could have addressed the issue
had it concluded that it was dispositive." Id. at 1413-14.
29 See id. at 1414.
The court referred to district and bankruptcy court decisions in the Fourth,
30 Id.
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, which allowed bifurcation. Id. However, the court also cited
cases from the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, which prohibited bifurcation. See id. at
1414-15 (citing In re Chavez, 117 B.R. 733, 736-37 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Sauber, 115
B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990); In re Schum, 112 B.R. 159, 162 n.3 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1990); In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 B.R. 200, 202-03 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989); In re Russell, 93
B.R. 703, 705 (D.N.D. 1988); In re Catlin, 81 B.R. 522, 524 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987)). The
Hart court noted that the lower courts within the Tenth Circuit were in dispute over the
proper application of § 1322. See id. at 1415 n.3.
The Hart court set forth the rationales on which the anti-bifurcation courts based their
holdings:
(1) the legislative history mandates protection of the home mortgage lender, and
bifurcation impermissibly dilutes that protection; (2) as a matter of statutory construction, the requirements of a specific section . . . control those of a general
section... ; (3) as a matter of statutory construction, the courts should look to the
definition of "claim"....., rather than the definition of "secured claim"...; and (4)
analysis of the legislative history should look back to Chapter XIII of the nowrepealed Bankruptcy Act ... for guidance in the definition of secured claims.
Id. at 1414. However, without addressing any of the above arguments, the court stated it
was "not persuaded" by these rationales and concluded that the plain meaning supported
"threshold bifurcation." Id. at 1415. But see id. at 1417 (Brorby, J., dissenting) ("I believe
[the anti-bifurcation] cases correctly analyze the problem and reach the better solution.").
31 Id. at 1415. The majority of courts, including those allowing bifurcation, recognize
that reducing the size of mortgage payments is a prohibited modification. See infra note 128
and accompanying text. However, the Hart court implies that a debtor may reduce the
monthly payments on the bifurcated mortgage by stating that "the Hart's plan provided for
the secured claim to be paid in full without adjustment in the interest rate or repayment
[Tihis plan ... is not a modification of the creditor's rights under the mortschedule ....
gage." Hart, 923 F.2d at 1415.
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secured portion of an undersecured mortgage.3 2 It is submitted,
however, that Congress's use of the terms "claim" and "modify" in
section 1322(b)(2) should be interpreted as precluding the modification of any portion of a home mortgage claim.3 3 Additionally, because section 506(a) on its face appears inapplicable to home mortgage claims,3 4 it is suggested that in a chapter 13 proceeding, the
claims of home mortgagees may not be bifurcated at all.
A.

"Claim"

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "Congress intended ... to adopt the broadest available definition of 'claim' "5
when it defined the term in the Code as a "right to payment,
whether or not such right is . . . secured[] or unsecured."36 Thus, it
is significant that the anti-modification provision in section
1322(b)(2), specifically stating that a plan may "modify the rights
of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by
. . . the debtor's principal residence, '3 7 fails to restrict the scope of
the word "claim" in the "other than" clause. 8
The Hougland court, reasoning that the "other than" clause
obviously referred to the "secured claims" language which preceded it in the sentence,3 9 suggested that it was not necessary to
"sen[d] the word 'claim' into the 'other than' clause flanked on
See Hart, 923 F.2d at 1415 ; Wilson, 895 F.2d at 127-28; Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1184.
" See infra notes 35-62 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
" See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111 S. Ct. 2150, 2154 (1991) (citing Pennsylvania
Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990)). In the Johnson case, the Supreme
Court held that a mortgage lien on real estate for which the debtor's personal liability was
previously discharged in a chapter 7 liquidation was a "claim" and therefore includable in a
chapter 13 plan. Id.
36 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (1988) (emphasis added). A "claim" is also defined as a "right
to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to
payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is ... secured or unsecured." Id.
§ 101(5)(B). The Code is clear that the automatic stay imposed upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition works to prevent the secured creditor from taking any subsequent action to
enforce its claim. Id. § 362(a); see also S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 5787, 5840-41 ("It
gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors"). However, the stay may be lifted as to
specific property or creditors, for cause. See supra note 5 (discussing automatic stay).
17 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
" See id.; see also In re Hynson, 66 B.R. 246, 253 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) ("The language
of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) does not specifically limit its protection to a secured claim secured
only by a security interest in such real property."). Contra Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1184
("Congress need not create such an awkward and wooden sentence structure.").
" Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1184.
32
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each side by the word 'secured.' "40 However, throughout the Code,
where Congress has intended to limit the scope of "claim," it has
done so with specific restrictive words.4 ' It is therefore asserted
that the word "claim" in the "other than" clause is indicative of
Congress's intent to protect the entire home mortgage from modification, without regard to the value of the property.
The placement of the anti-modification clause following the
"secured claims" language in section 1322(b)(2) was explained further by a Wisconsin bankruptcy court in In re Etchin.4 2 The
Etchin court agreed with Hougland that "[b]ecause the anti-modification clause begins with the qualifying phrase 'other than,'" it
must be applied to the "secured claims" clause immediately preceding it.43 "Home mortgages are, after all, a subclass within the
more general classification of holders of secured claims."' 4 However, the Etchin court asserted that the "secured claims" clause is
only "one of the referents of the anti-modification clause," and
criticized the Hougland court for "neglect[ing] to consider as referents the
larger universe of claims which are defined in 11 U.S.C.
§ 101. ''4
"
The Etchin court went further, asserting that the anti-modifi40

Id.; see also Wilson, 895 F.2d at 127 (agreeing with Ninth Circuit on "other than"

clause interpretation); In re Harris, 94 B.R. 832, 836 (D.N.J. 1989) (clause only applies to
secured claims); In re Simmons, 78 B.R. 300, 303-04 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987) (interpreting
clause as limiting only fully secured claims).
", See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988) (setting forth right to, inter alia, interest and fees
on "secured claim ... the value of which ... is greater than the amount of such claim")
(emphasis added); id. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (chapter 11 plan is fair and equitable "[w]ith respect
to ... secured claims, [if] the plan provides ... that the holders of such claims") (emphasis
added); id. § 1222(a)(2) (chapter 12 plan shall "provide for the full payment... of all claims
entitled to priority ... unless the holder of a particularclaim agrees to a different treatment of such claim") (emphasis added).
42 128 B.R. 662 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1991).
, Id. at 668. It is suggested that the most logical place to put the anti-modification
provision is after the "secured claim" language, because a mortgage on the debtor's principal
residence is usually at least partially secured. Furthermore, at the time the Code was enacted, the real estate market was in a period of rapid appreciation throughout the entire
country. See id at 667. Thus, it is suggested that Congress did not actually consider that
home mortgages might exceed the value of the property. However, the prohibition on any
form of alteration, other than cure and reinstatement, indicates that Congress intended absolute protection for this small class of important creditors. See also infra notes 108-115
and accompanying text (discussing public policy issues considered by Congress).
" Etchin, 128 B.R. at 668.
" Id. at 668. The "larger universe of claims" includes of course, any right to payment
or equitable remedy, including those which are unsecured. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (1988). See
supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (defining "claim" for Code purposes).
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cation clause was set apart with commas from the general language
of section 1322(b)(2) to "maintain the independence of the antimodification language from the 'secured claims' language preceding
it."4 As the court observed, without the commas, section
1322(b)(2) would allow debtors to "modify the rights of holders of
secured claims other than a claim. ' 47 In setting the clause apart, it
is suggested that Congress sought to ensure that the broadest possible definition of "claim" would be used to determine the protection for home mortgagees.4 8
B.

"Modify"

The minority courts' most vehement argument against the majority's plain meaning interpretation of section 1322(b)(2) centers
on the meaning of the word "modify. ' 49 The minority contends
that "the statute means what it says" and that to "reduce the dollar amount of claims secured by an interest in . . . the debtor's
principal residence ... would be a modification specifically prohibited by ...section 1322(b)(2)." 50 However, because Congress failed
to define "modify" in the Code,5 1 these courts have been forced to
look elsewhere to determine what Congress intended by its use of
the term. 52
In In re Schum, 53 a Texas bankruptcy court relied on a dictionary to determine that "[tihe ordinary meaning of the term
modify is: 'to change somewhat the form or qualities of; alter
somewhat; . . . to reduce in degree; moderate; qualify; . . . to
46

Etchin, 128 B.R. at 668.

Id. (emphasis added).
'8 Id.; see also In re Hynson, 66 B.R. 246, 253 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) ("emphasis ...
should be on the existence of a claim"); In re Simpkins, 16 B.R. 956, 963 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1982) ("emphasis should be on 'claim' ").
" See, e.g., In re Brown, 91 B.R. 19, 22 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) ("any modification of
such a claim is simply impermissible"); In re Catlin, 81 B.R. 522, 524 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1987) ("Application of § 506(a) ...would modify the rights of the holder ... beyond the
permissible impairment provided in § 1322(b)(2) and (b)(5).").
11 In re Boullion, 123 B.R. 549, 551 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990). "To read the statute
other than literally, as many courts have done, is to permit inroads into a protection afforded a class of creditors by Congress." Id. (citing In re Schum, 112 B.R. 159 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1990); In re Sauber, 115 B.R. 197 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990)).
" See Schum, 112 B.R. at 161; In re Demoff, 109 B.R. 902, 917 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
1989).
'" See infra notes 73-107 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of §
1322).
13112 B.R. 159 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990). "By failing to define the term 'modify,' Congress has enacted a rather ambiguous provision in § 1322(b)(2)." Id. at 161.
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change; to become changed."54 A number of courts have recognized
that what section 1322(b)(2) prohibits is the modification of the
"rights of holders '55 of home mortgage claims. Observing that a
mortgagee's rights include the right to full repayment of the loan,56
the right to benefit from the appreciation of the property during
bankruptcy, 57 and the right to receive payments of "the size, frequency and number" provided in the contract,5 8 these courts have

1,Id. (citing THE AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY (Random House 1970)) (emphasis
added). Other courts have also attempted to understand the ordinary meaning by resorting
to dictionaries. Although finding that § 1322(b)(2) permits bifurcation, the bankruptcy court
in Demoff, 109 B.R. at 917, referred to Black's Law Dictionary:"Modify. To alter, to change
in incidental or subordinate features; enlarge, extend; amend; limit, reduce. Such alteration
or change may be characterized, in quantitative sense, as either an increase or decrease."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 905 (3d ed. 1979) (emphasis added).
5 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988) (emphasis added); see Etchin, 128 B.R. at 666 (" 'rights
of the holders' and not the 'claims' alone which cannot be modified"); In re Hayes, 111 B.R.
924, 925 (Bankr. D. Or. 1990) (only modification of rights prohibited); In re Hynson, 66 B.R.
246, 253 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) (same).
" See, e.g., In fe Brown, 91 B.R. 19, 22 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) (even if claim were
undersecured, creditor would "still receive payment in full because the contract cannot be
modified").
V See Etchin, 128 B.R. at 667. The Etchin court recognized that § 1322(b)(2) preserves
"all of the 'rights of holders of secured claims' . . . [including] the right to credit bid with
the unsecured portion of the debt at a foreclosure sale or otherwise to avail themselves of
benefits from appreciation in the value of the property." Id. (footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court has recently determined that pursuant to § 506(d), a debtor cannot
avoid the lien on the unsecured portion of a mortgage on his principal residence, even if the
property was abandoned by the trustee in the debtor's chapter 7 case. Dewsnup v. Timm,
112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992). The Court reasoned that
[t]he practical effect of [the debtor's] argument is to freeze the creditor's secured
interest at the judicially determined valuation. By this approach, the creditor
would lose the benefit of any increase in the value of the property by the time of
foreclosure sale. The increase would accrue to the benefit of the debtor, a result
some of the parties describe as a "windfall.' We think, however, that the creditor's lien stays with the real property until the foreclosure. That is what was bargained for by the mortgagor and mortgagee .... Any increase over the judicially
determined valuation during bankruptcy rightly accrues to the benefit of the [undersecured] creditor, not to the benefit of other unsecured creditors whose claims.
. had nothing to do with the mortgagor-mortgagee bargain.
Id. at 778 (emphasis added). It is suggested that this reasoning applies with even greater
weight in the chapter 13 scenario, where the home lender has been afforded explicit protection not available in chapter 7. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988) with id. § 722. In a
lengthy and thorough dissent, Justice Scalia analyzed § 506(a) and (d) in relation to the
entire Code, and suggested that "[t]he feared 'windfall' to the debtor may be prevented by
11 U.S.C. § 551, which preserves liens avoided under § 506(d) and other provisions of the
Code 'for the benefit of the estate.'" Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 781 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
However, § 551 only benefits the creditor in a "trustee-managed foreclosure sale,'" and thus
is no help to the chapter 13 home mortgagee. Id.
" See Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Sav. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984) (permitted
modifications include changing size and timing of installment payments).
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concluded that reducing the amount due under the security agreement "necessarily entails a modification of the mortgage holder's
rights."'59
One bankruptcy court has stated that "[i]n order to afford section 1322(b)(2) any relevant meaning, we must find that the claim
referred to in this section applies to the entire claim ... ."1o It is
submitted, however, that even ignoring the practical justification
for precluding bifurcation of an undersecured mortgage, it remains
clear from the language of the Code that; regardless of the value of
the property, the debtor's plan is prohibited from altering the
terms of the mortgage contract. Unfortunately, by ignoring the
common import of the word "modify" in their interpretation of the
anti-modification provision,"' the majority courts have "carrie[d]
the syntax of the Bankruptcy Code to an absurd conclusion which
is at odds with . . . the clear legislative intent of . . . 11 U.S.C.
''62
1322(b)(2).
C.

Specific Provisions Control Those of General Application

While section 506(a) applies to cases under chapters 7, 11, 12,
and 13,63 section 1322(b)(2) applies solely to chapter 13 cases. 4 As
a matter of statutory construction, Code sections that pertain to a
specific chapter are generally deemed to supersede conflicting sections of general application. 5 Consequently, the minority courts,
" Etchin, 128 B.R. at 669. A bankruptcy court in the Ninth Circuit recently determined that changing the payments or interest rate would be an "impermissible modification," but that "under the Hougland ruling, some term of the agreement must be changed if
the debt is not going to be repaid in full." In re Hayes, 111 B.R. 924, 927 (Bankr. D. Or.
1990).
00 In
re Moran, 121 B.R. 879, 882 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1990); see also First Interstate
Bank of Ohio, N.A. (In re Woodall), 123 B.R. 95, 98 (W.D. Okla. 1990) ("using § 506(a) to
bifurcate would make the intent of § 1322(b)(2) a nullity, and the Court believes Congress
enacted § 1322(b)(2) for a purpose").
6' See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
62 In re Hynson, 66 B.R. 246, 253 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986). See generally infra notes 73107 (discussing legislative history).
11 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988); see also In re Roberts, 99 B.R. 653, 655 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1989) (citing Barkley, supra note 12, at 11-14); In re Russell, 93 B.R. 703, 705 (D.N.D. 1988)
(section 506 generally applicable to chapters 7, 11, and 13 of Code); In re Catlin, 81 B.R.
522, 524 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987) (same).
64 11 U.S.C. § 103(h) (1988).
65 See, e.g., id. § 1111(b) (superseding § 506(a) if creditor makes election); id. §
1325(a)(5) (superseding § 506(b) by requiring interest for time value of secured claim even if
not oversecured); see also In re Mitchell, 125 B.R. 5, 6-7 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) (more specific § 1322(b)(2) supersedes § 506(a)); Catlin, 81 B.R. at 524 (general §§ 502(b) and 506(a)-
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arguing that a conflict exists between section 506(a)'s generally applied bifurcation provision and section 1322(b)(2)'s specific antimodification clause, 6 assert that the conflict -must be resolved by
enforcing only section 1322(b)(2).7 However, one could argue that
sections 1322 and 506 do not conflict, but that section 506 is inapplicable to claims protected by section 1322(b)(2)'s anti-modification clause.
By enacting section 506, Congress recognized that, in many instances, debts are treated differently, depending on whether they
are secured or unsecured.6 8 Generally, section 506(a) applies when
it is necessary to distinguish secured and unsecured claims to determine the rights of the parties affected by the bankruptcy.6 9
In certain instances, however, the section is inapplicable because the secured or unsecured status of a claim will not alter the
claimant's rights.7 0 For example, it appears that section 506(a), by
(b) are superseded by specific provisions).
6 See, e.g., Mitchell, 125 B.R. at 6 (statutes in conflict "to a limited extent ...
[because] § 506 attempts to invade the protection of § 1322(b)(2) under the very narrow circumstances outlined therein"); Nobelman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobelman), 129
B.R. 98, 102 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (same).
17 See, e.g., Mitchell, 125 B.R. at 6 (specific provision governs); In re Hynson, 66 B.R.
246, 249 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) (same); In re Simpkins, 16 B.R. 956, 965 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1982) (section 506(d) does not affect payment rights under § 1322(b)(2)). In In re Sauber,
115 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990), the court noted that "Hougland takes an overly
technocratic approach.., relating section 506(a) to [§ 1322(b)(2)] .... [T]he proper setting
of the statutes in the context of the overall scheme of the Code, is as clearly missed as the
proverbial forest might be missed in examining the trees."
68 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (1988) (regarding distribution of property of estate); id. §
1111(b) (election of non-recourse debt).
Generally, chapter 13 claims may be classified as secured or unsecured pursuant to §
506(a) and then treated differently under the plan. See, e.g., id. § 1322(b)(1) (may "designate a class or classes of unsecured claims"); id. § 1322(b)(2) (may "modify the rights of
holders of secured claims . . . or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the
rights of holders of any class of claims"). Section 1325 provides for the true difference in
treatment under chapter 13 of secured and unsecured claims. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (describing treatment of claims in chapter 13). Section 1325(a)(5) mandates that secured claims receive full payment with interest unless the creditor receives the
collateral or agrees otherwise. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (1988). However, § 1325(b)(1)(B)
only requires that unsecured claims receive any surplus of the debtor's disposable income
over the amount necessary for secured claims. Id. § 1325(b)(1)(B). See generally 5 COLLIER,
supra note 3,
1325.08[1]-[4] (more expansive discussion on treatment of unsecured
claims).
" See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
70 See, e.g., id. § 1322(a)(2) (priority claims pursuant to § 507 entitled to "full payment,
in deferred cash payments" in chapter 13 debtor's plan). Furthermore, pursuant to chapter
l's fair and equitable test, the holder of an undersecured claim may elect to treat the claim
as fully secured and thereby take advantage of any appreciation in the value of the prop-
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its terms, simply does not apply to home mortgage claims. The last
sentence of section 506(a) provides that the value of property securing a creditor's claim "shall be determined . . . in conjunction
with any hearing on ... [the] disposition or use [of the property]
or on a plan affecting ... [the] creditor's interest.1 Because section 1322(b)(2) precludes a chapter 13 debtor's plan from "affecting" the rights of a home mortgagee, 2 it is suggested that section
506(a) is inapplicable to home mortgage claims. Thus, although
section 506(a) does not conflict with section 1322(b)(2), the claim
of a home mortgagee in a chapter 13 proceeding still should not be
subject to bifurcation.
The arguments posed by the courts opposed to bifurcation
demonstrate that the majority's plain meaning interpretation of
section 1322(b)(2) is by no means exclusive. Thus, the apparent
ambiguity of section 1322(b)(2) requires an examination of the legislative history to determine the intent of Congress in enacting the
section.
III.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Although the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code does
not provide an easy answer to the bifurcation issue, 73 it does establish a clear congressional intent to protect "homemortgagor [sic]
lenders, [who] perform[] a valuable social service through their
74
loans."
erty. See id. § 1111(b); see also Etchin, 128 B.R. at 666 (drafters of chapter 13 did not adopt
election provisions of chapter 11).
1 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988) (emphasis added); see supra note 7 (value determination of
collateral).
"' 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988); see also In re Simpkins, 16 B.R. 956, 968 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1982) (section 1322(b)(2) preserves right to payment as provided in contract but does
not make claim fully or oversecured).
11 See Wilson, 895 F.2d at 127. After reviewing the legislative history of § 1322, the
Third Circuit concluded that it did not provide "insight" regarding "'the modification of
any "unsecured" portion of an undersecured claim.'" Id. (quoting In re Gaglia, 889 F.2d
1304, 1311 (3d Cir. 1989)).
" In re Boullion, 123 B.R. 549, 551 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (quoting Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Sav. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 246 (5th Cir. 1984)). According to the court, Congress intended to establish a protected class of creditors in chapter 13 cases. Id. The courts
allowing bifurcation of home mortgages do not dispute that § 1322(b)(2) is intended as a
special protection for residential real estate lenders. See infra note 106 and accompanying
text; see also Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1185.
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Pre-Code Legislation

The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the "Act")7 5 "extensively recognized" secured creditors, but it did not clearly define their rights in
relation to the debtor or the estate. 6 Unfortunately, the courts'
attempts at filling the gaps resulted in conflicting decisions and
uncertain application of the law." In 1972, recognizing the many
inequities of the Act and its amendments, Congress created the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States to propose a new comprehensive bankruptcy law. s
In 1973, the Bankruptcy Commission issued a report that
thoroughly examined the "inadequacies in Chapter XIII, including
[the] treatment of secured claims."' 9 To prevent consumer creditors from coercing the payment of excessive claims by threatening
to repossess a debtor's personal belongings,80 the report recommended limiting secured claims on personal property to the value
of the creditor's security interest.8 l
In addition, noting that chapter XIII of the Act prohibited the
debtor's plan from dealing at all with claims secured by real property, 2 the Commission recommended that the new Code provide
71 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 1.
7' See Bowman & Thompson, supra note 7, at 569.
7 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 157; see also Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 239 (erratic and uncertain application resulted from a "hodgepodge of state and federal statutory
provisions") (quoting S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 5799); 5 COLLIER, supra note 3, T
1325.06 (15th ed. 1981). As a result of the uncertainty, chapter XIII was largely forsaken by
debtors for the predictability of liquidation. Id. T 1325.06[1].
Commenting on the state of the law in chapter 13 proceedings, the House Judiciary
Committee stated:
Most often in a consumer case, a secured creditor has a security interest in property that is virtually worthless to anyone but the debtor. The creditor obtains a
security interest in all of the debtor's furniture, clothes, cooking utensils, and
other personal effects. . .[which] have little or no resale value. They do, however,
have a high replacement cost. The mere threat of repossession operates as pressure on the debtor to pay the secured creditor more than he would receive were he
actually to repossess and sell the goods.
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 124
(1977) [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT].
78 See S. REP. No. 989, supra .note 1, at 5787-89; see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 3, at 2 ("[p]roblems which caused the commission to be created").
71 See generally COrMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 3, at 157-67 (consumer bankruptcy
problems and recommendations).
80 See id. at 1123-24.
See -id. pt. 2, § 6-201(2); Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 243-44.
82 Bankruptcy Act, ch. 575, § 606(1), 52 Stat. 840, 930 (1938), repealed by Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549, 2549. Under Chapter XIII, a
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for the limited treatment of such claims. s3 Section 6-201(4) of the
report stated that a plan "may include provisions for the curing of
defaults within a reasonable time and the maintenance of payments while the case is pending on claims secured by a lien on the
debtor's residence. 8 4 The Commission explained that allowing the
reinstatement of a home mortgage pursuant to a chapter 13 plan
would enable a debtor to "preserve his equity in his home."8 " However, the proposed bill "[did] not authorize reduction of the size or
varying of the time of installment payments." '
The House version of chapter 1387 contained most of the Commission's recommendations 8 and expanded the Commission's proposal regarding the debtor's ability to modify claims.8 " The House
bill provided that a chapter 13 plan may "modify the rights of
holders of secured claims or of holders of unsecured claims."9 0
Thus, it exposed debts secured by real estate or personal property
to "modification by the reduction of the secured creditor's lien to
only the value of the collateral."'" Furthermore, the House bill distinguished between the debtor's right to modify claims and his
claim was defined as "all claims of whatever character against the debtor or his property...
whether secured or unsecured ... [,] but shall not include claims secured by estates in real
property or chattels real." Id. (emphasis added). To give some protection to the debtor's
home, courts often enjoined creditors from enforcing such liens and allowed the debtor to
cure and reinstate pursuant to the courts equitable powers. See Hallenbeck v. Penn Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566, 568 (4th Cir. 1963); In re Garrett, 203 F. Supp. 459, 460 (N.D.
Ala. 1962); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 165.
83 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 204-05.
" Id. at 204.
" Id. at 206.
88 Id. Thus, the Commission's rec6mmendations permitted the debtor to deal with his
home mortgage by cure and maintenance, but they did not permit the reduction of such
claims to the value of the property. See Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d
236, 244 (5th Cir. 1984).
87 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 530-45 (1977) [hereinafter H.R. 8200]. Although the
Commission submitted a proposed bill in the 93rd Congress, no action was taken during
that session. See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 5787. In the 94th Congress, the Commission's bill was re-introduced along with an alternative bill prepared by the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges. Id. at 5788.
After extensive hearings on the parallel bills, the House passed H.R. 8200 on February
1, 1978. Id.
88 See Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 242. But see S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 5787 (although House bill passed rather than Senate bill, its lariguage contained much of the Senate
bill's text).
88 H.R. 8200, supra note 87, at 537.
80 Id.
SI Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 243 (citations omitted).
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right to reinstate the "original agreed payment schedule," 92 thus
implying that a plan could either reduce the principal of a loan to
the value of the property securing it or provide for the cure of a
loan default and the continuing payment of regular installments."
The Senate bill, although ultimately rejected in favor of a
modified House version, 4 effected a substantial change in the
House proposal.9 5 During the Senate hearings, 9 representatives of
secured creditors testified that, although chapter 13's cure provisions were tolerable, allowing debtors to alter the size and timing
of installments and permitting the reduction of a secured claim to
the value of the collateral would cause lenders to restrict the flow
of credit to the home mortgage market.9 7 Recognizing the impor91Compare H.R. 8200, supra note 87, at 537 (§ 1322(b)(2)) with id. (§ 1322(b)(5)).
According to § 1322(b)(5), the plan may "provide for the curing of any default within a
reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the case is pending on any unsecured
claim or secured claim on which the last payment is due after the date on which the final
payment under the plan is due." Id. The final version of the Code contained this exact
provision, except that it is now preceded by the clause "notwithstanding paragraph (2) of
this subsection." See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1988).
03 See Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 243; see also infra note 102 (modified claim must be paid
within plan term).
See Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 242.
See S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. §1322(b)(2) (1978) [hereinafter S. 2266].
See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 5788. The Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery took testimony from over 70 witnesses and received comments
from hundreds of interested parties between February and November of 1975. Id. After
amassing additional information throughout 1976, the Senate eventually introduced its bill,
S. 2266, supra note 95, on November 1, 1977. Id. Thereafter, the subcommittee held further
hearings on the proposed bill, taking testimony from approximately 60 more witnesses and
accepting hundreds of additional recommendations. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 5788.
97 Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 245 n.13. Counsel for the Senior Vice-President of the Real Estate Division of Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance gave the following testimony at the
Senate hearings:
With respect to savings and loans, in particular, and the future prospects for loans
to individuals under the proposed bills, there is really only one basic problem.
That is, the provision in both bills that provides for modification of the right of
the secured creditor on residential mortgages, a provision not contained in the
present law.
...[S]avings and loans will continue to make loans to individual homeowners,
but they will tend to be, I believe, extraordinarily conservative and more conservative than they are now in the flow of credit.
It seems to me that they will have to recognize that there is an additional
business risk presented by either or both of these two bills if the Congress enacts
Chapter XIII in the form proposed, thus providing for the possibility of modification of the rights of the secured creditor in the residential mortgage area.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2266 and H.R. 8200 Before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 715 (1977) (statement of Robert E. O'Malley).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:443

tance of freely available capital for the purchase of homes to individual consumers and the national economy, the Senate amended
its proposed bill to preclude modification of loans "wholly secured
by real estate." 5
B.

The Bankruptcy Reform Act

The final version of the Code was a compromise of the House
and Senate bills, reached through "a series of agreed-upon floor
amendments in both houses." ' The Senate ultimately agreed to
limit the scope of protection of section 1322(b)(2) to claims "secured only by ... the debtor's principal residence."' 100 While there
are no on-the-record remarks regarding the change of language
from "wholly" to "only,"''
it seems clear that Congress intended
to prevent the word "wholly" from being read as protecting only
fully secured claims against modification.
However, while the version of section 1322 that was ultimately
enacted prohibits the debtor from modifying the rights of a home
mortgagee, it does provide him with the power to cure.'0 2 Congress
11

S. 2266, supra note 95, § 1322(b)(2); see Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 245.
99 Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Sav. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 136, 246 (5th Cir. 1984); S. REP.
No. 989, supra note 1, at 5788.
...11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
'01 See Hart, 923 F.2d at 1412 (citing In re Neal, 10 B.R. 535, 539 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1981)). The Neal court doubted whether the change was intentional since "'wholly' secured
fits more neatly into the overall statutory scheme." Neal, 10 B.R. at 539. Although this
position would be persuasive if Congress intended only to protect the secured portion of
home mortgages, it is suggested that the change indicates Congress's intent to protect the
entire claim.
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1988); see also In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982)
("Indeed, earlier Senate bills along with House bills and the present statute listed the power
to cure and the power to modify in different paragraphs, indicating that the power to cure is
different from the power to modify.").
It is suggested that if a debtor's plan reduces the secured claim to the value of the
collateral and modifies the contract pursuant to § 1322(b)(2), the debtor must repay the
entire secured claim within the period of the plan pursuant to § 1322(c). See 11 U.S.C. §
1322(b)(2), (e). However, the courts permitting strip down implicitly permit the debtor to
repay the reduced claim according to the modified amortization schedule, extending beyond
the plan's term. See infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text. It is submitted that, when
read in light of § 1222(b)(2) and (c), such an interpretation is clearly erroneous. See 11
U.S.C. § 1222(b)(2), (c) (1988).
Congress enacted chapter 12 of the Code for the special protection of family farmers,
see ANDREA J. WINKLER & JEAN K. FITZSIMMON, LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY
JUDGES, UNITED STATES TRUSTEES, AND FAMILY FARMER BANKRUPTCY ACT, app. 1, at 1813-14
(15th ed. 1989), and in doing so granted them greater protection than the chapter 13 debtor.
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1222 (1988) with id. § 1322. There is no exception to modification for
home mortgage lenders in § 1222(b)(2) (chapter 12's version of § 1322(b)(2)), and §
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thus expressed its intent that although a debtor may not change
the terms of his loan agreement, 10 3 he could nevertheless save his
home' 04 by curing his loan default and reinstating his original payment schedule. 0 5
All courts that have considered section 1322(b)(2) agree "that
Congress intended to accord home mortgagees preferred treatment
under the law."' However, as the minority courts construing section 1322 have stated, "apply[ing] the cram down provisions of...
11 U.S.C. § 506 to [home mortgagees is] ...at odds with the clear
intent of Congress to protect a lender's security when a lender is
secured only by a security interest in a Chapter 13 debtor's
07
home."'
IV.

NECESSARY IMPLICATIONS

Chapter 13 gives debtors with a regular income a "fresh
start" 10 8 by allowing them time to restructure their debts. 109 A
1222(b)(9) permits payment of a modified claim "over a period exceeding [five years]").
Thus, it is submitted that if Congress intended to permit chapter 13 debtors to reduce their
home mortgages and pay the reduced secured claim over a period exceeding the length of
the plan, Congress would have included in chapter 13 language comparable to that found in
§ 1222(b)(9).
103 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
'1 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (cure provisions intended to permit
debtor to save equity in home).
105 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1988). In discussing the impairment of secured claims
under chapter 11, the Senate report stated the following:
The holder of a claim or interest who under the plan is restored to his original
position, when others receive less or get nothing at all, is fortunate indeed and has
no cause to complain. Curing of the default and the assumption of the debt in
accordance with its terms is an important reorganization technique for dealing
with a particular class of claims, especially secured claims.
S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 5906. Here, Congress explicitly stated that the cure of a
claim, under chapter 11, necessitates payment in full. Id. It is suggested that the treatment
of a home mortgage lender under chapter 13 that results in less than full payment is clearly
contrary to Congress's intent to protect the home mortgage industry.
"IoNobelman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobelman), 129 B.R. 98, 103 (N.D. Tex.
1991); see also Wilson, 895 F.2d at 128 ("anti-modification provision. . . inserted on behalf
of home mortgage industry"); Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1185 ("Congress intended to benefit
residential real estate lenders"); In re Hildebran, 54 B.R. 585, 586 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985)
("legislative intent . . . was to provide stability in the long term residential housing
market").
10
In re Hynson, 66 B.R. 246, 252 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986); accord Boullion v. Sapp (In re
Boullon), 123 B.R. 549, 551 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Chavez, 117 B.R. 733, 736
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990).
108H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 6079.
1* See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
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chapter 13 repayment plan, while enabling the debtor to retain
possession of his property, 110 also benefits the secured creditor,
who is likely to recover more under the plan than he would
through a forced sale.' Under a repayment plan, the debtor must
either pay secured creditors the fair market value of the collateral
securing their claims' 2 or cure any default and resume regular
payments in accordance with the parties' original agreement.' 13
However, recognizing the importance of home mortgage lenders to
society, Congress enacted section 1322(b)(2) to provide them with
protection not available to other secured creditors,"' and thus balanced the "fresh start" policy against the need for the availability
of home mortgage loans." 5
For years following the enactment of the Code, the majority of
courts considering section 1322(b)(2) held that home mortgage
lenders possessed an absolute right to full repayment." 6 However,
the recent circuit court cases have relied on a plain meaning interpretation to allow the strip down of undersecured mortgages" 7 and
have failed to recognize that such a construction "produce[s] result[s] demonstrably at odds with the intention of . . . [section
1322(b)(2)'s] drafters.""'
To determine whether bifurcation frustrates Congress's intent
to favor home mortgage lenders, it is necessary to examine the
treatment of claims secured by property other than the debtor's
1o

See S.

REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 6079.

See id. ("The benefit to creditors is self-evident: their losses will be significantly less
than if their debtors opt for straight bankruptcy.").
,,2 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (1988); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text. In the alternative, the debtor may surrender the collateral to the holder
thereof and thereby avoid treatment of the claim under the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C)
(1988).
"1 Id. § 1322(b)(5) (1988). The debtor may also cure and maintain payments on unsecured claims. Id.; see also infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text (discussing treatment
of holders of non-residential mortgages).
14
See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988); see also Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n,
730 F.2d 236, 246 (5th Cir. 1984) (home lenders need special protection from modification);
In re Simpkins, 16 B.R. 956, 963 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) ("Congress wanted to protect the
lender secured only by a security interest in the ... debtor's home.").
1,0 See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
110 See, e.g., Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 242-46 (cure does not amount to modification).
"7
See, e.g., Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1183. "There are times when the quest for meaning
should begin and end 'with the language of the statute itself.' "Id. (quoting United States v.
Ron Pair Enters., 409 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)).
1'" Ron PairEnters., 489 U.S. at 242 ("intention of the drafters, rather than the strict
language, controls").
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principal residence."" As previously indicated, a creditor with a security interest in personal, property has a secured claim equal to
the fair market value of the collateral. 2 ' Pursuant to section 1322,
the debtor may modify the rights of such a creditor, or the debtor
may cure his default and maintain regular payments on the
claim.' 21 If modification is elected, the creditor must receive full
22
payment on the secured portion of the claim, including interest.
The permitted modifications only include reducing the lien to the
value of the collateral, altering the payment schedule, and adjusting the interest rate to reflect the revised payment plan's effect on
23
present value.
Alternatively, if a debtor elects to cure his default, he must
within a reasonable time provide for the payment of past due installments, plus late charges and fees, and he must continue to
make regular payments on the debt as they become due. 24 Furthermore, a debtor who elects to cure must satisfy the creditor's
entire claim pursuant to the terms of the contract, without regard
25
to the value of the collateral.
Although few of the courts permitting bifurcation of home
mortgages have explained how the reduced secured claim should
be treated, 21 their reasoning implies that a mortgage secured

'19See In re Hayes, 111 B.R. 924, 926 (Bankr. D. Or. 1990) (considering debtor's options regarding property other than principle residence).
2I See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988); supra note 7 (discussing § 506(a)).
.2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(5), 1325(a)(5) (1988); see Hayes, 111 B.R. at 926 (discussing
alternatives for treatment of claims).
122 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (1988); Hayes, 111 B.R. at 926; supra note 8 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the debtor's plan must provide for total payment within three to
five years. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1988).
323 See Hayes, 111 B.R. at 926. If the value of the collateral exceeds the principal balance of the claim, the creditor is also entitled to interest, costs, fees, etc., as provided in the
contract, to be paid under the plan as part of the secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b)
(1988).
124 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1988).
325 See Hayes, 111 B.R. at 926. "[T]he debtor has two alternatives for treatment of a
claim secured other than by a security interest in the principal residence. He or she may
either leave the contract intact (maintain and cure) or alter the terms and pay the present
value of the secured claim (cram-down)." Id.; see also Clark v. Federal Land Bank of St.
Paul (In re Clark), 738 F.2d 869, 871-72 (7th Cir. 1984) (" 'cure' . . . is to remedy or rectify
. . [the
(
default and] restore matters to the status quo ante"); 5 COLLIER, supra note 3, T
1322.0914] ("creditor receives the interest charges and costs to which it is entitled under the
contract and applicable nonbankruptcy law").
'26 See Hayes, 111 B.R. at 925 ("Hougland does not suggest how to structure plan payments to reconcile the 'special protection' of § 1322(b)(2) with the fact that only a portion of
the outstanding balance may be repaid under a plan"); see also Wilson, 895 F.2d at 128-29
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solely by the debtor's principal residence is to be treated the same
as any other undersecured claim. 12 7 Attempting to give some meaning to the protective clause, most of the courts allowing strip down
have concluded that section 1322(b)(2) only prevents debtors from
altering the interest rate or reducing the payments on their
debts.12 8 Thus, amortization of the reduced principal is accelerated
and the debt satisfied earlier than originally intended. Since the
debtor must maintain the full payment provided in the note, bifurcation does nothing to reduce present debt service or assist in giving the debtor a fresh start. Instead the debtor realizes a future
windfall. 12 9
With its claim bifurcated, the home mortgage lender will often
receive payment only on the secured portion of its claim. Thus, the
home mortgagee's rights are almost identical to those of any other
secured creditor."30 The only difference is that a home mortgage
lender will receive the interest rate and payments provided in the
mortgage contract,' 3 ' while other secured creditors may have their
interest rates altered and their payments reduced. 13 2 However,
where the debtor elects to cure his default and maintain payments,
the holders of home mortgages are treated identically to other secured creditors under the majority's interpretation of section
1322(b)(2). 13
It is suggested that Congress balanced the benefit of allowing a
debtor in bankruptcy to adjust the mortgage on his principal resi(allowing modification of unsecured claim but not discussing treatment of secured claims).
But see Hart, 923 F.2d at 1415 (discussing treatment of secured portion of debtor's home
mortgage).

However, the Hart decision implies that the debtor may reduce the installments due
under the contract. See supra note 31. This interpretation is contrary to the majority opinion of the courts, including those allowing bifurcation. Id.
".7See Schum, 112 B.R. at 162. In Schum, the court rejected bifurcation, reasoning

that it "would have the effect of treating real property secured by only a lien on the debtor's
principal residence in the same manner as any other property secured by a lien." Id.
See Hayes, 111 B.R. at 926-27 (plan may not alter monthly payments to reflect
reduced secured debt); In re Shaver, 58 B.R. 166, 167 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (reduction of
payments and interest rate impermissible modification); In re Wilkinson, 33 B.R. 933, 935
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same); see also Jeffrey W. Morris, The Undersecured Home Mortgage Lender in Chapter 13, FAULKNER & GRAY'S BANKRUPTCY L. REv., Summer 1990, at 5455.
See Morris, supra note 128, at 54-55.
. See supra notes 119-23 (discussing treatment of claims secured other than by security interest in principal residence).
129

"'
'J.

See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.

See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1988); see also supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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dence against its desire to protect home mortgage lenders by allowing the debtor to cure and reinstate his original contract. By
permitting home mortgages to be stripped down, the courts grant a
windfall to individual debtors at the expense of potential home
buyers who will be forced out of the market by a restricted flow of
credit.""
Thus, it is submitted that permitting the bifurcation and strip
down of mortgages secured only by the debtor's principal residence
renders section 1322(b)(2) essentially meaningless, thereby vitiating Congress's clear intent to protect residential mortgage lenders,
who "perform[] a valuable social service through their loans."' 13
"I See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 5792. "The [Senate] committee feels that the
policy of the bankruptcy law is to provide a fresh start, but not instant affluence ...." Id.
(emphasis added); see also Nobelman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobelman), 129 B.R.
98, 104 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (" 'bifurcation... would result in a windfall to debtors who would
then repay only the value of their residence, and reap the benefit of their discharged "unsecured" claim if property values rise' ") (quoting First Interstate Bank of Okla., N.A. v.
Woodall (In re Woodall), 123 B.R. 95, 97-98 (W.D. Okl. 1990), rev'd, 931 F.2d 62 (10th Cir.
1991)).
The Hougland court reasoned that lenders should protect themselves by requiring a
greater spread between the loan amount and the value of the real estate collateral.
Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1184; see also In re Frost, 96 B.R. 804, 807 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989)
("Absent intentional depreciation by a debtor or very abnormal economic times, most holders of first mortgages should be fully secured"), afl'd, 123 B.R. 254 (S.D. Ohio 1990); cf.
Caster v. United States (In re Caster), 77 B.R. 8, 13 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) ("most mortgages ... are fully secured due to ... appreciation of housing values") (emphasis omitted).
However, it is suggested that again, this analysis contradicts Congress's intent. See In re
Sauber, 115 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990). Presumably, in granting special protection to home mortgagees, Congress intended to stimulate the economy by increasing the
number of potential home purchasers, thereby increasing new home sales and producing
more jobs. Broad use of bifurcation, especially during recessionary periods, will likely cause
most mortgage lenders to require larger down payments and increase interest rates, thereby
placing "'a higher price tag on home ownership.'" See Groups Ask Exemption from
Cramdowns, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, June 10, 1991, at 22 (quoting Mortgage Bankers Association's John Davey, Senior Vice President of Draper & Karmer, Inc.). Consequently, it is
suggested that potential first-time and upgrade buyers with sufficient incomes to support
90-95% financing will be forced out of the market by lenders requiring 20-30% down to
adequately protect their loans from bifurcation. See Senate Committee Weighs Impact of
Home Mortgage Cramdowns by Ch. 13 Debtors, Banking Rep. (BNA), at 1082 (June 10,
1991). Additionally, widespread bifurcation is likely to have a severe impact on the secondary mortgage market and government guarantee agencies. See Groups Ask Exemption from
Cramdowns, supra, at 22 (quoting Frank Keating, General Counsel of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development); see also Cramdowns in Bankruptcy Raise Questions of
PublicPolicy, Secondary Market Impact, Banking Rep. (BNA), at 568 (Mar. 25, 1991) (discussing effects on secondary market).
"5 See Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Sav. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 246 (5th Cir. 1984).
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CONCLUSION

The courts presently allowing the strip down of residential
mortgages in chapter 13 dismiss the critics who assert that such
treatment of home mortgagees is precluded by section 1322(b)(2)
of the Code. However, these courts treat home mortgage lenders
and other secured creditors almost identically, thereby frustrating
Congress's intent to protect residential mortgages and increase the
availability of credit for the purchase of homes. In enacting chapter 13, Congress sought to assist debtors by, inter alia, permitting
the cure of home mortgage defaults and allowing debtors to reinstate the original terms of their loan contracts. It is submitted that
Congress did not intend to allow debtors to reap a windfall by
stripping their home mortgages down to the value of their property, but indeed sought to prohibit such action by adopting section
1322(b)(2).
Erik D. Klingenberg
POSTSCRIPT: THE NEXT CIRCUIT

On the eve of publication of this Note, the Second Circuit, in
Bellarny v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.,"6 followed "the
three circuits"' 137 by holding that section 1322(b)(2) permits strip
down of home mortgages."3 8 However, unlike the other circuits, the
Bellamy court did not rely solely on the plain meaning of the
Code."
The Second Circuit based its holding primarily on the revised
Code's preference for treating claims as secured or unsecured,
rather than treating creditors as secured or unsecured. 4 ° In light
of this "fundamental change" in bankruptcy law, the court stated
"the 'rights' which may not be modified under §1322(b)(2) must be
defined in terms of the claim, not with reference to the status of
the claimant."'' Therefore, the court reasoned, the "other than"
...No. 91-5045, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 7768 (2d Cir. Apr. 21, 1991).
117 See supra notes 15-31 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth, Third
and
Tenth Circuit Court decisions regarding Section 1322(b)(2)).
138

See Bellamy, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 7768 at *35.

,19 Id. at *7-35; supra note 32 and accompanying text (other circuits relied on plain
meaning).
1,0 Bellamy, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 7768 at *9-11; see also notes 75-105 and accompanying text (discussing change in bankruptcy law under Code).
,' Bellamy, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 7768 at *10.
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clause must be read as precluding a modification of only the secured portion of the home mortgage claim (as defined by section
506(a)).14 2 The court also applied this reasoning to dispose of the
creditor's argument that the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Dewsnup v. Timm 4 ' precludes the use of section 506(a) to bifurcate secured claims.""" The Second Circuit acknowledged that section 1322(b)(2) was obviously intended to benefit home mortgage
lenders; 145 however, it is submitted that its analysis of the legislative history is clearly flawed.
While recognizing that the Senate's proposal prohibiting modification of 'claims wholly secured by real estate mortgages' was
intended to "retain Chapter XIII's exception for mortgagees, 1 46
14
the court failed to recognize that the congressional compromise 7
merely limited what was an exception for all real estate mortgages
to only home mortgages. 4 8 The Second Circuit did not explain
why the compromise should be interpreted as granting less protec49
tion for home mortgages. Neither the slight change in language
nor the subsequent legislative history of section 1322(b)(2),150 indicate that Congress intended to limit the existing exemption from
treatment for mortgages secured by the debtor's principal
residence. 5 '
The Bellamy court quickly disposed of the litany of arguments
raised by appellant and amici. While declaring that "the terms of
payment must, at a minimum, remain unchanged or the prohibiId. at *11.
143 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992); see also note 57 (discussing limited application of Dewsnup to
§1322(b)(2)).
Bellamy, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 7768 at *19-24. The Second Circuit noted that the
Dewsnup holding was limited to lien avoidance under 11 U.S.C. §506(d), not the treatment
of claims under 11 U.S.C. §1322(b)(2). Id.
' ' See id. at *17; see also note 106 and accompanying text.
"' Bellamy, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 7768 at *16-17.
147 See id. at *17; supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (final version of
§1322(b)(2) represented a compomise between House and Senate proposals.).
141 See 11 U.S.C. §1322(b)(2); see also Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n., 730
F.2d 236, 246 (5th Cir. 1984); supra note 100 and accompanying text.
141 Compare S.2266, supra note 95 ("modify the rights of holders of secured and unsecured claims, except claims wholly secured by real estate mortgages.") with 11 U.S.C.
§1322(b)(2) ("modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only
by ... the debtor's principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims .... ).
10 See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text; Bellamy, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
7768 at *16-17.
I'l See Bellamy, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 7768 at *15; supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
142
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tion on modification is meaningless, ' 152 the court failed to recognize that principal and length of repayment are two of the four
repayment terms. 153 The court attempted to dismiss the arguments
that strip down does nothing to promote the debtor's fresh start
and instead provides a future windfall 5 " by reasoning that the future windfall is itself "a measurable contribution to the Code's
'155
'fresh start' policy.
Ironically, the Second Circuit concluded its dismissal of the
many arguments that strip down is exactly what Congress intended to prevent, by stating that "the balance to be struck between promoting home ownership and protecting residential mortgage lenders is one for the legislature, not the court, to make."'
Unless overruled by the Supreme Court, the four Circuit
Court decisions are likely to result in restricted availability of
credit for home purchasing, contrary to Congress's intent in enacting section 1322(b)(2).
Erik D. Klingenberg

"'

3*6

See Bellamy, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 7768 at *27.
See id.
See supra notes 129, 134 and accompanying text.
Bellamy, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 7768 at *34.
Id. at *35.

